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The Cuban Missile Crisis remains one of the most intriguing events of the Cold War. And 
many aspects of those tense days when the world came closer to the threshold of nuclear 
holocaust than at any other time in modern history remain controversial. Not surprisingly, 
the Crisis is a frequent target for both revisionism and sombre reflection in the effort to 
provide better explanations of those complex events.  
The recent books by Roger Hillsman and Mark White make interesting companion 
volumes not only because they reflect the prevailing dichotomy over the way the 
Americans handled the Crisis but also of trends in revisionist history. Hillsman writes 
from the perspective of one who actually took part in the decision-making process now 
given the opportunity to talk freely as a result of declassification of much source material. 
His aim is to provide a better explanation of how decisions were actually reached under 
stress and at times without full information on Russian and Cuban actions. White, on the 
other hand, challenges the competence of the crisis management process through a re-
examination of the White House tapes and from a mass of background material on the 
key participants.  
The contrasts are extreme and, at times, troubling. For instance, while there is reason to 
question many of President Kennedy's personal traits, his respect and commitment for the 
office of President has never been seriously in doubt. Yet White's assertion that 
Kennedy's early reactions to the Crisis may have been influenced by amphetamines (p. 
118) begins to paint a picture that some will not accept. Admittedly, there are many who 
remain faithful to the Kennedy legend, warts and all, and Hillsman is probably one, but 
for assaults on that legend to be credible they must be carefully substantiated  White's 
very negative picture of Kennedy is not. And although Hillsman's portrayal of Kennedy 
is far kinder, it fully acknowledges that tensions existed and that the decision-making 
process was frustrating, frequently because of the lack of accurate information, and 
because opinions were sharply divided on the solution to a unique situation. The two 
books thus take very different perspectives of Kennedy and his key advisors.  
Herein lies the difficulty. For someone who has no prior knowledge of the Crisis, the 
arguments presented by Mark White could seem compelling. Yet, for anyone with some 
knowledge of those events, especially of the workings of Kennedy's Executive 
Committee (the ExComm) formed to handle the Crisis, White's work is suspect on 
several counts. First, he relies very heavily on the open parts of the White House tapes to 
draw assumptions about the various discussions and on the motives of specific 
participants in the decision-making process, yet those tapes are not fully declassified. 
Second, he does not adequately explain why his assumptions are better than the 
conventional wisdom. He simply introduces too much new material without convincing 
the reader that his views are right and others are very wrong.  
On the other hand, White's "in-your-face" analysis raises some fascinating questions. But 
without time and resources to examine them fully, there is just too much that challenges 
the conventional wisdom to accept his interpretation at face value. There are several 
instances though where White's views can be quickly checked against Hillsman's book. 
One of these is the role played by Senator Keating as a Republican "spoiler." White casts 
Keating in an almost noble role, speaking out against a Kennedy conspiracy of silence on 
the threat posed by Russian re-armament of Cuba. This is very different to the view of 
Hillsman who dismisses the Senator as a merely political opportunist. One has to wonder 
whether Hillsman is still repeating the Democratic Party's line or if White is making far 
too much out of the political opposition to Kennedy in Congress.  
In some respects, one can come to a conclusion that White also has his own agenda in 
writing the book. For instance, he focuses on select issues rather than on the overall 
decision-making process. One of these is the discussion on the blockade of Cuba to 
which, in fact, he devotes a chapter without mentioning the fact that a blockade was 
never established  it became a quarantine on military equipment. Nor does he point out 
that the serious implications in international law of declaring and/or establishing a 
blockade were well-known, as the vast majority of earlier works on the crisis make clear. 
Hillsman, however, discusses the blockade and quarantine in the context of the 
ExComm's discussions on how best to solve the problem. The missiles had to go, we all 
know that, but "how?" was the issue they agonized over. Here, both accounts make 
interesting reading, but it is Hillsman who is able to present the case for the option that 
allowed the Russians a way out. As he points out, despite strong military calls for an 
attack on Cuba, there was an equally strong voice against that course of action. And both 
authors establish that Robert Kennedy in particular did not want to commit the United 
States to an act he saw as comparable to Pearl Harbor. While Hillsman describes this 
aspect of the ExComm process in fairly moderate terms, White records the debate as a 
monumental clash of wills between the main "protagonists" where perceived ideological 
clashes seems more important than finding a solution to the problem.  
It is such stark contrasts that mark the difference between the two books. Hillsman, albeit 
still a Kennedy loyalist, attempts to provide a better insight into the decision-making 
process by expanding on what has been written already. He does this through the use of 
newly declassified material. As such it is a credible addition to the enormous volume of 
work on the Cuban Missile Crisis. White attempts to prove that defects in the 
personalities of both Kennedy and Khrushchev directly led to the 1962 crisis. In this, he 
attacks conventional wisdom in a manner that makes his book read more like the script 
for an Oliver Stone movie than a useful contribution to the literature on the Crisis.  
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